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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
Survey of Ohio Law-1956
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Administrative Authority
Invalidity of statutory authority is an occasional ground for attacking
the authority of an admimstrative agency. There is an example of this in
the recent decision of the court of appeals' m the Film Censorship case.?
Since the basic statutes3 were invalid because of a conflict with the "free"
speech guarantees of the fourteenth amendment 4 the Superintendent of
the Division of Film Censorship in the Department of Education had no
authority to censor motion pictures and require a license from the De-
partment of Education before exhibiting motion pictures.
Administrative Discretion
Two courts of appeals decisions considered specific aspects of judicial
review of the exercise of administrative discretion. In a board of election
action in receiving late filings of campaign expenditures by successful
candidates, the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County5 refused to upset
the decision of the local board of elections in the exercise of -its discre-
'R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Education, 130 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio
App. 1955).
'This decision reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County -which had refused to enjoin the Superintendent from enforcing the censor-
ship and licensing requirements. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc. v. Hissong, 123 N.E.2d 441
(Ohio C.P. 1954), commented on, 1955 Survey, 7 WEST. RES. L. REV. 255, 257
(1956).
aOMiO REV. CODE §§ 3305.01-3305.08.
'The per curiam opinion of the court of appeals states that the judgment is reversed
on the authority of R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Dep't of Education, 162
Ohio St. 263, 122 N.B.2d 769 (1954), holding that any censorship order made by
the Department of Education of the State of Ohio pursuant to such act must be held
to be "unreasonable" and "unlawful" within meaning of OHIO REV. CODE §
3305.07 This was an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio brought pur-
suant to Omo REV. CODE § 3305.07, to review the orders of the Department of
Education. The majority opinion expressed the view that its decision was manda-
tory in view of the position taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Superor Films v. Dep't of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)
'Brewer v. De Maioribus, 136 N.E.2d 772 (Ohio App. 1956). The court also
determined that the filing requirements of OHIo REv. CODE § 3517.10 were man-
datory, but that the time within which the statement should be filed was merely
directory, and that the board did not abuse its discretion in accepting the filings
under the circumstances.
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tionary acceptance of the filings under -the circumstances, pointing out
-that a court of equity will not substitute its judgment for that of a board
of elections acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in the absence of dear
proof of an abuse of discretion.
The Board of Liquor Control under the Liquor Control Act is em-
powered to exercise its discretion in determining whether the grant of
an original permit or its renewal would not be conducive to the health,
morals or general welfare of the public; and its refusal to grant a permit
when based upon reliable, probative and substantial evidence will not be
disturbed.6 The court remarked that all presumptions favorable to the
board's ruling must -be indulged by the reviewing court, in arriving at a
decision whether .the demal by the board was an accordance with law.
Notice Requirements in License Revocations
Ohio Revised Code section 119.07 states that an agency required to
give a hearing under the provisions of section 119.06 shall give notice
to a party of his right to a hearing, if requested within 30 days of the time
of the mailing of the notice. The court of appeals has held that the notice
requirement applies only in the event the agency acted upon its own
-initiative and without any prior hearing. It did not therefore apply in
a situation where an applicant had had a hearing before the Board of
Liquor Control prior -to an order revoking a permit. The statute does
not contemplate the right to a second hearing before the Board on the
issue of revocation.7
Hearing Before the Administrative Agency
1. Officzal Nonce
In a license suspension appeal the common pleas court had determined
that a chemical analysis of the liquor involved in the hearing was im-
properly admitted. On appeal the court of appeals had to determine
whether a bottle which bore a label identifying it as wine with a content
of 20% alcohol by volume was competent evidence of -the contents. It
was held -that at is such common knowledge in Ohio that wine is an
intoxicating beverage that the lower court and inferentially the Board of
Liquor Control could take notice of its reputed intoxicating quality.
8
'American Legion Clifton Post v. Board of Liquor Control, 135 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio
App. 1955)
7 State v. Board of Liquor Control, 131 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1953).
'Mazzeo v. Board of Liquor Control, 136 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio App. 1955)
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2. Objecuons to Admtssibility
While the rules of the Board of Liquor Control provide that the
production of evidence before the Board is to be governed by the rules of
evidence required by Ohio courts in civil cases, on appeal the counts hold
that the evidentiary rule must be invoked at the administrative hearing by
a party objectang to its admissibility.9 Thus hearsay evidence received
without objection may be properly considered and given its natural
probative effect, as -if it were admissible. In another administrative ap-
peal case,10 the court of appeals took notice of applicant's objection that
the Board of Liquor Control restricted the evidence which he could sub-
mit an support of his new application for a liquor permit. The record,
however, failed to show that any restricted evidence was proffered. Under
such circumstances the exclusionary ruling would not be prejudicaL
3. Entrapment
The court of appeals held that entrapment, -if estabhshed, may be em-
ployed as a defense to charges preferred against a licensee by -the Di-
rector of Liquor Control in a proceeding before the Board of Liquor
Control.11
Judicial Review
1. Rule Makng
One court of appeals had to answer an attack upon its jurisdic-
tion on two grounds in hearing an appeal from a decision of the court
of common pleas, holding valid for legality and reasonableness certain
rules adopted by the Ohio State Racing Commission.12  To the first
objection, that the review of rules provided by Ohio Revised Code section
119.11 is administrative and not judicial, the holding was that the review
as a judicial function within the jurisdiction of the courts of Ohio. Then,
to ,the specific objection that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to
review the common pleas court, the answer was that Revised Code section
119.11 authorizes such an appeal.
2. Methods of Revtew
A court of appeals decision refused to interfere by -the use of the in-
junctive process to prevent an agency's instituting proceedings for the
'Di Matteo v. State, 130 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio App. 1955).
1 0Scharff v. State, 99 Ohio App. 139, 131 N.E.2d 844 (1955)
nLangdon v. Board of Liquor Control, 98 Ohio App. 535, 130 N.E.2d 430 (1954)
'Standard '"ote" v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 98 Ohio App. 494, 130 N.E.2d
455 (1954).
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revocation or suspension of a license. This case also raised a question of
the necessity for the adoption of administrative rules specifying the spe-
cific acts or conduct which may be used as a basis for citations for violation
of the statutory cause for revocation of liquor permits: "other sufficient
cause, to wit, failure to maintain decency and good order on permit
premises."' 3  It was held that the Board of Liquor Control need not
anticipate and list through rules and regulation the many reasons for
the issuance of citations against permit holders to show cause why per-
mits should not be suspended or revoked.
The Supreme Court continues to deny the use of the writ of prohibi-
tion against an administrative agency as an alternative method of judicial
review. In an original action 4 in the Supreme Court to prevent the
Ohio State Racing Commission from allegedly exceeding its statutory
powers, the court denied the writ because there was a plain, adequate
remedy afforded by a provision in the statute for the use of the injunction.
This decision must be contrasted with that of the court of appeals in
Gouachenour v. Hendrzcks,15 -in which a petition in prohibition was held
good against a demurrer, wherein -it was alleged that the statutory appeal
would result in irreparable injury to the petitioner's business.
Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal to review the
discretionary action of an administrative agency. Thus the issuance,
suspension, revocation or renewal of liquor permits by the Board of
Liquor Control may be reviewed by a statutory appeal which precludes
the use of mandamus in the absence of a showing that the Board has re-
fused or failed to comply with a specific requirement of the law.'6
Another interesting court of appeals case considered whether the court
of common pleas could dismiss an appeal from an order of the Board of
Liquor Control refusing to renew a permit, when there was already pend-
ing an appeal from the same common pleas court's decision in a contempt
proceeding ordering that a renewal be granted. It was held that the statute
covering the appeal required the common pleas court to hear and deter-
mine the appeal.' 7
3. Notuce of Appeal
A court of appeals determined that Ohio Revised Code section 119.12,
aHowell v. Bryant, 99 Ohio App. 49, 53, 130 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1954)
"'State v. Ohio State Racing Comm n, 164 Ohio St. 312, 130 N.E.2d 829 (1955).
m99 Ohio App. 27, 131 N.E.2d 228 (1954).16State v. Board of Liquor Control, 131 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1953)
"1 n re Socotch's Appeal, 137 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio App. 1953) It had already been
held in Socotch v. Krebs, 97 Ohio App. 8, 119 N.E.2d 309 (1953), that the court
did not have jurisdiction in the contempt citation to reach the quesuon involved on
the appeal.
[Une
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
requiring that notice of appeal from an administrative agency decision
must be filed within the 15 days after the mailing of the notice of the
order, sets out a mandatory requirement which must be observed regard-
less of the reason for the failure to give notice.' 8 This position is similar
to that previously taken under the statutes applying to the Public Utilities
Commission and the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.
4. Appeal by the Admwnstratwe Agency
. The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act did not originally make any
provision for an appeal by an agency,19 and the Supreme Court held that
the agency could not appeal.2 The Court of Appeals of Franklin County
had taken a contrary position previously, and in three decisions2' rendered
prior to the amendment of the law in 1953 that court denied motions to
dismiss appeals by the Board of Liquor Control.
Since the amendment to the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, it is
now very dear that the agency may appeal.2 2 Indeed, in one case an ap-
peal was taken without any objection being made.23
5. Scope of the Revew of an Agency Order
Under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act as originally enacted,
the Supreme Court had held in Farrand v. State Medical Board24 that a
court of common pleas in reviewing an order of an administrative agency
could not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. The General
Assembly, in 1951, rewrote the entire paragraph of Ohio General Code
section 154-73 relative to appeals2 5 Despite the insertion of additional
authorization for action by the reviewing court, in Rufo v. Board of
Liquor Control26 the court of appeals held that the statutory change did
not affect the prior rule of the Supreme Court and that -the reviewing
court has no power now to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
'Arndt v. Scott, 134 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio App. 1955).
" OHio REV. CODE § 119.12, amended, 125 Ohio Laws 342, effective Oct. 21, 1953.
:'Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953). See
1953 Survey, 5 WEST. RES. L. REv. 229 (1954)
' Tuma v. Board of Liquor Control, 137 N..2d 788 (Ohio App. 1953).
'State v. Board of Liquor Control, 131 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1953), applying
the remedial procedure to proceedings pending before the amendment in accordance
with its terms.
"Fernberg v. Board of Liquor Control, 130 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio App. 1954).
U 151 Ohio St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113 (1949).
'This is identical with the present provisions of OHio REv. CODE § 119.12, rela-
tive to powers of the court upon an appeal.
' 130 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio App. 1954).
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Such a construction of the amended statute was challenged in the Su-
preme Court. In reversing the court of appeals in the Rufo and a com-
panion case, the court stated that the statute now provides for something
more than a review on merely issues of law as proclaimed in the Farrand
case. The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, however, now provides
for an appeal which still falls short of a trial de novo. The common pleas
court is limited to an examination of the record of 'the hearing before
the administrative agency and such additional evidence as the court in its
discretion may allow to be presented upon the theory that it is newly
discovered:
The court must read and consider all the evidence offered by both
sides and must appraise all the evidence as to the credibility of the wit-
nesses, the probative character of the evidence and the weight thereof.
In other words, the court may reverse, vacate or modify the order of the
agency, unless it finds that it is supported by reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence and is in accordance with law.-'
Thus if the common pleas court cannot make a finding -that the agency's
order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is
in accordance with law, it is authorized to reverse, vacate or modify the
order of the agency.
Where there is a finding that the order of an agency subject to review
under these provisions is supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence, the common pleas court, in practice, must affirm the order if
it is otherwise in accordance with law, according to numerous court of
appeals decisions.2 8
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AGENCY
The Problem of the Borrowed Servant
A problem of frequent occurrence and considerable difficulty arises
where a servant is, at the tune of the accident, acting in some sense as a
servant of two masters. The typical case involves a general employer who
'Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 280, 131 N.E.2d 390, 393,
394 (1955)
'Quinn v. State Board of Real Estate Examiners, 137 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio App.
1956); Burgerr v. Board of Liquor Control, 135 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio App. 1955);
Abdoney v. Board of Liquor Control, 101 Ohio App. 57, 135 N.E.2d 775 (1955);
DiMatteo v. State, 130 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio App. 1955); Ross v. Board of Liquor
Control, 135 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio App. 1954); Shranko v. Board of Liquor Control,
134 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio App. 1953); Miecznikewski v. State, 135 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio
C.P. 1952)
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